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Identity Management
Identity management has recentlyemerged as a critical foundation forrealizing the Internet’s business ben-
efits in terms of cost savings, manage-
ment control, operational efficiency, and
most importantly, business growth. Enter-
prises need to manage access to informa-
tion and applications scattered across a
wide range of internal and external com-
puting systems. Moreover, they must pro-
vide this access for a growing number of
users, both inside and outside the organi-
zation, without compromising security or
exposing sensitive information. Manag-
ing multiple versions of users’ identities
across multiple legacy applications makes
the task even more daunting.
For this issue of IEEE Internet Comput-
ing, we invited researchers and practition-
ers to submit articles describing all aspects
of identity management technology and
practice. Together, the articles present both
background and some in-depth coverage
of some fundamental research questions
that must be addressed.
Technical Hurdles
Among the major challenges to effective
identity management is controlling infor-
mation when the entities that need to
access it are dispersed and highly diverse.
The field also faces some standard technical
questions, including how to control access
to information in databases. The best
answers to such issues often depend on
whether the requestor is someone inside or
outside the organization. Other questions
relate to cryptography and associated pro-
tocols. We must be able to verify an elec-
tronic sign-on’s authenticity, for example,
and digital signatures must be applicable
when nonrepudiation is required. 
As the articles in this issue show, many
of the challenges to identity management
come from a desire to grant single-sign-
on access to a collection of resources that
might well have different, even contradic-
tory, access-protection rules. Thus, the
single-sign-on mechanism must also per-
mit that access-control to function as it
would in a multiple-sign-on environment.
In addition to purely technical issues,
we must consider the human factors in
any e-commerce situation. Some com-
pare to existing behaviors in traditional
situations, but others are new to the
domain of electronic transactions. These
factors differ according to the transact-
ing entities’ natures.
The standards and practices under
which business-to-business (B2B) trans-
actions operate — usually between a
limited number of entities at different
enterprises — are quite different from
those needed for electronic retailing, in
which customers appear at random.
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These situations also differ from those involving
organizations’ internal information needs;
although we can plan to grant access to infor-
mation only as needed, codifying such access
rules can be difficult because individuals often
have multiple responsibilities.
Furthermore, as legislation and public policy
evolve, new technical issues arise and expectations
increase; if electronic transactions are regulated by
law, then users expect those transactions to be
conducted in accordance with the regulations. B2B
transactions are usually subject to audits, for
example, and many database transactions that
involve personal data, such as financial or health
records, are increasingly subject to governmental
regulation. Not even individual retail transactions
are entirely unregulated. Finally, certain situations
dictate that an electronic identity remain anony-
mous. That is, we must be able to verify a specific
identity, but the only attribute information that
should be transferred is its validity.
Because the legal status of electronic data and
transactions is in a rapid state of flux, we elected
not to delve too deeply into the public policy ques-
tions that surround identity management. In the
US, for example, the Graham-Leach-Bliley Act and
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountabil-
ity Act of 1996 (HIPAA) have mandated certain
levels of accountability with regard to the privacy
of electronic financial and health data, but laws
and legal precedents are different around the
world. In many cases, we still lack operational def-
initions for standards of behavior because the
problems are new, jurisdictions are different, and
an adequate set of test cases has yet to appear on
which to base accepted practice.
About this Issue
In response to the call for this issue, we received a
significant number of submissions addressing a
range of issues as broad as the topic itself. We
selected the following three articles for publication
because they represent the theme well, presenting
both background and relevant research results.
In “Managing Multiple and Dependable Identi-
ties,” Damiani, De Capitani di Vimercati, and Sama-
rati discuss an approach to controlling multiple
robust identities in an electronic world, a crucial
issue in developing the next generation of distrib-
uted applications. As described here, a digital iden-
tity is the electronic representation of an individ-
ual’s or organization’s sensitive information. A
system that manages identity must, of course, be
reliable. It must also permit the user to control the
disclosure of information associated with the digital
identity, and it must move with the user rather than
be fixed in location. To a great extent, identity-
management solutions have required the creation
and use of trusted third parties as the authority or
intermediary. Despite some differences, this is not
unlike the authority often assumed as part of a pub-
lic key infrastructure. Three protocols now describe
how to establish such third-party intermediaries in
single-sign-on authentication: Microsoft’s .NET
Passport, Oasis’s Security Assertions Markup Lan-
guage (SAML), and the Liberty protocol. 
In the second article, “Analysis of Liberty Sin-
gle-Sign-on with Enabled Clients,” Pfitzmann and
Waidner examine a (subsequently fixed) flaw they
discovered in the Liberty protocol, and discuss the
general nature of third-party authentication meth-
ods. In a scheme like the one the Liberty Alliance
has proposed, users each sign on with identity
providers, which then authenticate them to subse-
quent services. The Liberty protocol lets clients
remain unaware of the cryptographic specifics,
other than that secure channels (such as SSL) will
be used in the usual way. A disadvantage of
secure-channel protocols such as Liberty is that the
third party’s intervention with asymmetric encryp-
tion is slower than direct communication using
symmetric-key encryption. In some situations,
notably intra-enterprise transactions, we could use
the concept of “enabled clients” (as described in
the article) to take advantage of existing, depend-
able information to improve efficiency without
compromising security or authenticity.
Finally, Skogsrud, Benatallah, and Casati
describe their proposed trust negotiation frame-
work in “Model-Driven Trust Negotiation for Web
Services.” In their approach, trust negotiations
involve signed assertions regarding the owners’
attributes rather than the outright transfer of
requesters’ identities. Historically, trust manage-
ment systems have been difficult to get right; they
have also been difficult to adapt in changing envi-
ronments that involve enterprise policies and reg-
Many challenges come from the desire
to grant single-sign-on access to
collections of resources that might have
contradictory access-protection rules.
ulations. This article describes a state-based lan-
guage for trust management that offers a poten-
tial solution to these problems.
Future Work
Security professionals often view security objec-
tives as “keeping the bad guys out” on one hand
and “letting the good guys in” on the other. Keep-
ing the “bad guys” out is important and has
received considerable attention in recent years. It
makes for good press and cops-and-robbers sto-
ries, and it is perhaps the first objective that should
be addressed. All the same, organizations can
obtain true productivity gains only by letting the
“good guys” in. Identity management is the cor-
nerstone technology for achieving this goal. As
such, it is likely to remain a pressing issue for
many years to come.
Traditionally, identity management has been
concerned with managing an organization’s
employees to ensure that their authentication and
authorization information is consistent and up to
date within the organization’s information sys-
tems. This traditional arena continues to pose
many challenges for security architects and
designers, especially given the large base of lega-
cy systems. However, the true value of identity
management comes into play with business part-
ners and consumers. The ability to federate iden-
tity across organizations while maintaining clear
trust, liability, and cost responsibilities is a major
challenge for enterprises as we continue to pursue
efficiency and cost savings in cross-organization-
al business and customer-relationship processes.
There are many research and development
challenges to address before seamless identity
management becomes a reality. We need stan-
dards to build trust, authority, and policy rela-
tionships across organizational boundaries. First,
end consumers need assurances regarding privacy
of sensitive information, particularly given the
prevalence of “identity theft.” 
We must further elaborate the interplay between
authentication and authorization rather than fol-
lowing the classical approach and treating them as
orthogonal issues.  We must also refine existing
access-control models to reflect the obligations on
the provider and consumer of identities in multi-
party transactions.  We need lightweight and user-
transparent protocols with zero, or very small,
footprints to run on end users’ machines. At the
same time, we need to look ahead to emerging
client-side platforms that permit some degree of
trust in the end systems themselves. We are just
beginning to come to grips with these issues.  They
should ensure interesting research problems and
scenarios for many years to come. 
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